Abstract-This paper formulates the system equations, state and control space constraints, and a criterion functional for an elementary example of a problem in economic growth, and discusses some further interpretation of the underlying economic structure. Several examples are presented to illustrate particular features of control problems in economics; references to futher examples, and to more general work in mathematical economics, are cited.
L. The underlying economic characteristic to be reflected ill t.he esample is, first., that the rate of increase of the labor force is to a large ex3,ent dewrmined by two factors which are t.henxelves the product of noneconomic considerations. These two factors are the rate of population growth and the proportion of the population which participates in production as members of the labor force. The rate of populat.ion increase presumably depends on sociological consideration, psychological issues, and moral pressures, all usuajly considered outside t.he realm of economic theory. The labor force participation rate, while clearly responding to economic conaiderat,ions, is frequently assumed to be near enough constant, as t.0 justify, as a rough approximat.ion, taking the labor force to be a constant fract,ion of the population. (Of course, these assumptions can be weakened.)
The upshot of such argument i that one system eqnat.iou in the esample takes t,he form
t ( t ) (menhear) = n(t) (per year).L(.t) (men) (1)
where it is usually assumed that n(t) is a given p0sit.ir.e constant.
On the other hand, while the labor force may be a matter which is determined by considerations outside the influence of economists or social planners, it is clear that the rate of increase of the capit,al stock -which is what t,he economist calls "net investnlent."-is decidedly a product of economic decisions.
On the one hand, there is t.he whole set of considerations stemnliug from the fact that directing resources to the product.iot1 of new machines and equipment to be added to the capit,al stock means divert.ing resources from the production of goods which could be used for current comumpt.ion and enjoyment. Since the purpose of accumulat.ing capit.al goods now must, be to create capacity to produce consumer goods in t.he future, the decision becomes one of trading off consumpt.ion now for t.he sake of consumption later. This saviug decision determines the resources which could be made available for producing additions to the capital stock.
But. new machines and equipment have to be ordered, or at least ordels for them have to be anticipated, before anyone is willing t.0 produce t.hem. Thus against the resource availabilit.y side, the saving side, one has to place the demand for new equipment, t,he investment side. From t.he trro independently determined quanti&-the resources demanded by producers desiring to invest in new capacity and the resources potent.ially available from savers prepared to defer current, consumption to acquire a claim against future consumpt.ion-a realized flow rate of addit.ions to capacity is determined (assuming depreciation and required replacement are made good separately).
One simplified set. of hypotheses supposes that. the community in the aggregate makes available, for purposes of investment in new capacit.y, resourca equal to some specified fraction of national income. At the same time it is supposed t.hat, by snit.able national policy, demand for investment goods is brought into line sit.h available saving, so saving decisions are always realized. These assump tions may be expressed, ignoring depreciat,ion, by the equatiom: k (machmes,lyear) = I ($/year).l machine/S (2 1 which expresses t.he way in which investment expenditures Z are translated int.0 increases in productive capacity measured in physical units;
S (S/year) = sY ($/year) (3) which expresses t.he saving decision of the community; and I ($/year) = S (S/srear) (4) which expreses the equilibrium condition that the desired rate of investment expenditure be reconciled, presumably by some monetary or fiscal policy of the central government, with the saving behavior of t,he communit.y.i These equat.ions thus lead to the simple system equation
where s is a positive (dimensionless) constant and Y is national income measured in $/year! To express nat.ional income in terms of the state variables is the final task in developing system equations for the simplified model. For this, one goes to a body of the economic literature dealing with "production functions. " Solow [91] surveys this literature, which a& tempts to derive empirically the form of statistical relat,ionships (corresponding in principle to engineering functions) linking output t.0 inputs of machine services and labor services. From such study is derived a relationship
where the funct.ion F is usually assumed to be a positive function having a t least two continuous derivatives with
and t.0 be positively homogeneous of degree one in K and L. (To be precise, t.he variables K and L entering the function F should be interpreted as mukiplied by a utilization factor of unity, having dimensions machine-years/year!machine and man-years/year/man, respectively.)
Assuming the existence of such a production function, one may then wit^ t.he basic system equations purporting to describe the aggregate economy (i.e., the "plant" the economist studies) in t.his example as
4 Equation (4) may be interpreted as a condition +at-mpst be satisfied if the economy is t.o be operating at full employment, that LS! It 18 an equatatlon ahlch s s u m e s t h a t t h e problems of short-run economic stabllization have been dequat.ely solved. For purpose3 of studying the long-run evolution of an economy, this may be a justifiable assumption. 6 Here t.he unit S is to be interpreted simply 85 a unit of homogeneous physical product. There is no provision in this simple example for changing prices.
C. Constraints on Controls and State Space
If t.he aggregate saving rate s is completely determined and social policy is directed in such a way as to ensure realization of that. saving rate through invest.ment decisions, then t,he evolut.ion of the whole system is itself completely determined once init.ial conditions are specified. (Study of the behavior of this system wit.h specified saving rate, which is oft.en referred to as the Solow model [93] , has been estensive: as has been discussion of similar models with slight.ly different t.heories determining individual saving.6 See [33] .) Suppose, on the ot.her hand, that the saving rate of individuals can be influenced by various incentives or short-run social policies, so that, t,he aggregate saving rate becomes an instrument of long-run social policy or a cont,rol variable. Then the problem becomes a conventional problem in cont.ro1 theory with one obvious const,raint, namely, that the saving rate s is only to take on values which could in fact. be realized by some feasible social policy. Since s is a proportion of out.put. saved and directed toward capital accumulation, it is, in a closed system, clearly limited to values in t,he unit interval and may, in fact, be still further restricted for economic reasons.
Moreover, economic quantities generally share t,he feature belonging to concepts like miss distance or aircraft height. above ground: they cannot. assume negative values. Hence we must impose the conditions K 2 0, L y o along with the control space constraint 0 5 s 5 1. Thus we have a state-space description, system equations, and cont.ro1 and statespace constraints. What is required now is a met-hod to evaluate the desirability of various trajectories sat.isyfying all the imposed conditions.
D. criterion
I n discussions of economic growth it is usually assumed that ultimate concern attaches t.0 the welfare of households, not, 6rms or other intermediate agents created only as part of a system to serve households. This suggests that the performance of an economy should be measured by the final consumption levels it makes poesible. (Of course, t.hk criterion must be tempered by consideration of t.he dstribution of consumption and of wealth, but it is often assumed in problems of the type considered here that these matters can be taken care of by some polit.ica1 process-that a higher rate of consumption flow can be appropriately redistributed so as to leave everybody better off.)
But since an economy produces many different goods for consumption purposes, one must consider how to evaluate various output combinations. Therefore, consider for a moment a (column) vector C, whose components indicate the rates of consumption desired by one individual of each of the many goods available. To explain t,he determination of this vect,or, that is, to explain an individual's demand for goods and services, early t.heorists proposed that each individual possessed a utility function U ( C ) defined on this consumpt,ion space or space of consumption bundles. These theorists then viewed the consumer's decision as one of maximizing this indicator T/T subject to restrictions on total expenditure and t.0 non-negat,ivit.y rest.rict.ions. Speczcally, the problem was: for given p , E, where p is a given row vector of positive prices and E is a given positive constant., maximize U ( C ) subject t.o PC 5 E, C 2 0. The resulting value U ( C ) was to be taken as an indicator of consumer satisfaction. This was t,he classical problem of consumer's choice, a static problem in possibly many dimensions. With sufEcient regularity assumed for the function U, some meaningful proposit.ions may be obtained about changes in the solution vector C in response to changes in t.he 6 It is also oossible that savine decisions of individuals mav be made in accord with individcal i n t e y l criteria; functionals, thus leading t d a descriptive mode:
in which explicit in lvidual long-run maximizing behavior is part of the uncontrolled system. But discussion of this issue must be deferred to Section 111. 
I t should be emphasized that specialization of the functional to this form assumes a very strong independence (additivity) through t.ime.'
Further specialization entails the assumption that t.he influence of t,ime w o r k uniformly on all goods, so that, U(C, t ) ma? be decomposed into a timeless utility function U ( C ) and a discount factor a ( t ) . Thus t.he criterion becomes
and if it be assumed that the discount factor a ( t ) has exponential form, then one obtains the common criterion be interpreted in per capita terms, denoted by lower case letters, and that the utility function U ( c ) may be interpreted as appropriate for a representative man or for the community as a whole.
Three 
Weizsacker [lo51 and McFadden [59] discuss this criterion and the conditions under ahich rankings under it might agree with rankings under the earlier criterion. Before leaving discussion of the performance index for an economy, it may be observed that C at any time can be t,aken to be a funct.ion of the st.ate and the control variables, so that the criterion functional really depends only on the time paths for these variablej and the initial state,. Thus if one wished not to commit himself on the claim that only h a l consumption is relevant to social welfare, he could formulate the utility indicator simply as a function of state and control variables, without altering any of the preceding comments significant.ly. Thus one has a state description, system equations wit.h given initial conditions, and a criterion functional to be maximized subject to imposed state and cont.ro1 const,raints. Each of these components of the control problem is seen to arise naturally in t.he context of standard economic theory. Before passing to some specific examples, it may be appropriate to look briefly at some further interpretation of the problem.
h T H E R ECONOMIC INTERPRETtlTIOX
In the preceding example, the final formulation of the system to be This applies still to an individual.8 However, by a leap of faith, studied was one could say that. all components of t.he consumption vector are to
It can also be noted that any monotonically increasing t.ransformation of the index J will preserve the ranking assigned by the criterion, but that. any transformation of C other than a linear transformation will amount t o changing the weighting scheme attached to utilities and, therefore, willnot preservetheorder assigned by J . This means that the function U must be thought oi as a numerical, rather than simply an ordinal, measure. 
This simple example illustrates some features of a fairly general which might be mitten as case, where IC, Y , and u are all to be vectors. The additional constraints u1 the system G stem from the "static allocation problem'' referred to before. To explain the significance of t.hk issue in economic problems requires a short digression into stat,ic economic theory.
One of the characteristic features of an economic syst.em is that it is driven by a mechanism involving many conscious individual decisions, all somewhat interdependent and simult.aneously undertaken.
There is, therefore, need for an explicit theory to explain how the system configuration is determined at any given instant., before even considering the evolution of the economic system over time.
To simplify t.he issue, the economic theorist introduces the notion of competitive markets and thereby succeeds in treating as independent. a number of decisions which previously were highly interdependent. This remarkable analytical device, which permeates economic theory, d l prove to be closely related to the cent.ral analytical device in systematic treatment of optimal cont,rol problem.
(Precisely in the cases where the assumption of competitive markets is untenable, one has to deal wit.h all the intractable problem of interdependent, decisions which in economics go under the names of oligopolistic or duopolistic warfare, undue exercise of market power, or rivalrous competition and which in theory might have to be described by immense problems in differential games or something similar.) The idea is straightforward. One int.roduces auxiliary variables (prices) which each decision maker treat6 as given paranletel>, in the light of which he makes his individual decisions. A "maSket," mechanism is imagined to tally all individual decisions and to adjust. the auxiliary variables until all individual decisions are conahtent, one m-it.h another.9 It usually t.urns out also that under t.heze circumstances the result.ing system configuration sat.isfies some principle of efficiency analogous to the principle of least, action, sometima described as the principle of t,he invisible hand.I0
As an analytical technique the t,rick cannot be bettered. What is particularly interedng is that it. was not in fact developed as an analytical trick, but. actually was intended as a descript,ion of t.he may in which an economic system seems to operate. The auxiliary variables, in ot.her words, may not be simply analytical constructs determined by subst,itut.ion int.0 some equality constraint, but extant observable quant,ities capa,ble of being read from a catalog or a ticker tape; not only concept,ually determined but visible and capable act.ually of guiding a system to a configuration in which innumerable individual decisions are all mutually consistent.. What makes up the "system" referred to previously? How is it to be dmcribed? I n a simplified breakdown one might separate decision-making agents into only two classes, "households.." and "firms," wit.h primary importance attaching to the welfare of the former, the firms ultimately being merely instrumenk to serve the needs of households by organizing production activities. For t.he moment. it. will not hurt to talk also as if ownership of all capital and labor resides wit.h households.
Furthermore, one might postulate t.hat firm t.ransforn1 the services of existing machinery and equipment and of labor into output of new machinery and also of goods for householh on tern% established by the existing technology. Households i n turn acquire goods and offer services for product,ion. (See Fig. 1 services, and for labor services.11 On each market aprice is defined for the flow of goods, the flow of capital services, and t,he flow of labor services, rcspectively. Taking the price received for his output and the prices paid for rental of equipment and labor sen-ices, all a s given, each firm's manager decides, in the light of his technological capacity, on the amounts of inputs it is appropriate for him to purchase and the amounts of out.put he shall produce. Because of t,he intervention of the price mechanism, it is unnecessary and irrelevant for him to ask who wants his product or what they aant. -4ll such relevant information is summed up in t.he price he treat* as a parameter; likewise, d relevant information on the supply of inputs is cont.ained in the prices for t,hese. Thus the firm enters the goods market as a supplier of output and the market for services as a demander of labor or machinery servim.l2
On the other hand, households, facing t.he same prices, decide on what, services they w i l l offer, t.hus determining t.heir income, and on what goods they will buy. Again, t.he price quot,ations contain all the informat,ion necessary and thus permit. complete separat,ion of household decisions from firm decisions.'3 Unless the resulting decisions of all firms and all households are jointly consistent, the price quot.ation must be adjusted. (Clearly, it is a nice quest.ion to determine t.he conditions under ahich the existence of an? equilibrium price vect.or is guaranteed and the mechanisms under n-hich convergence to the equilibrium price vector would be assured. For The simplifying assumption which is crucial to almost, all growth models is that. t.he system is always in static equilibrium in the sense that prices are always at t.he values which clear all markets described in Fig. 1 . That. is, it is assumed, in a sense, that it is legitimate to work as if time could be stopped, wiph no transactlions taking place and no growth of s e t s , until the price adjustment proces wit,hin the blocks labeled static price adjustment in Fig. 1 has converged to the price adjustment.
11 These markets are sbonn in Fig. 1 in the dashed inner block labeled stat.ie . . '2.The role of the firm is represented in Fig. 1 by the block labeled production block.
hold block.
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The household decision is illustrated in Fig. 1 by the block labeled bouse- moment.ary solution. It is this assumption that enables t,he growth theorkt to treat. "equilibrium dynamics'' (see Hahn [ 3 2 ] ) in concentrating on long-run evolut,ion of t,he system rather than shorbrun market adjustment. I n most, early growth models, as in the simple example developed above, this problem of momentary equilibrium was t.rivially solved. Assuming that households offer all available capital and labor for product,ion, t.he amount of output is det,ermined and only t,he distribution of output between consumpt,ion and investment remains a t issue. Letting prices for capit.al and labor sel-vics settle a t whatever rates absorb available supplies and specifying the saving rate s completes determinat.ion of the momentary equilibrium, and attention then focuses on the growth of assets, reprEented by t.he portion of Fig. 1 above the dashed line. More recent work, however, has dealt with models which produce distinct, good? in distinct. sectors of the economy, and in such cases t,he problem of allocat.ing available resources betneen different, uses and determining the out,put flows of d products entaik considerat.ion of a fairly large nonlinear programming problem (or at. best a nonlinear simultaneous equations sysvsfem).
One further k u e demands brief comment. It has long been recognized that markets for durable assets (capital marketsj differ from markets for flows of good and services precisely because such markets involve traders required to hold assets. In a model with one capital good t!his cause no trouble because there is only one kind of durable good, only one store of value which can be held. I n more recent growth models wit,h many distinct capital goods or with money and other financial assets as well as capital goods, t,here are different, ways to hold assets, and decisions must be made as to appropriate portfolios to be held and appropriate holding periods for items in the portfolio. The standard argument (see Hot, elling [39] , and Samuelson [ 7 6 ] ) has been t,hat, in a perfect. capital market, if there were a yield or discount. rate ro(t) specified at each time t, then an asset with a current earnings flow Ri(t) at time t would in principle command a price equal to t,he present discounted value where and S(T) is some scrap value a t the terminal dat,e T . Assunling a zero scrap value and differentiat.ing, one finds t,hat. this perfect asset price should change over time in such a way that $ i * ( t ) = -R(t) + ro(t)pr*(t).
Thk basic "zero profit" relationship says t,hat capital gains or losses should always be such that t,he t,otal return (current earnings plus rate of price change) is neither more nor less than the imputed interest ret.wn on the asset value pr*(t). Unless the preceding differential equat.ion were satisfied for all assets in the system, traders xould presumably be attempting to dispose of those assets wit.h lower 3ield in exchange for those with higher. Exist.ing stocks of all asets are voluntarily held only when all of these different.ia1 equations are satisfied.lc It may be not,ed in passing t.hat these condit,ions are appropriate only when concerns about liquidity, transactions costs, and so on can be ruled out,. Introducing a more satifactmy portfolio theory into the analysis at. this point would ent.ail treating a growth model ait,h important st,ochast.ic components; thi t.opic is an open research problem. Fig. 2 sets out the st.ruct.ure of one possible model in which capital markets are import.ant. The basic market st.ructme for services of capital goods and labor and for dist.ribution of nondurable consumer goods remaim unchanged; what. is added is a portfolio decision for households (it makes 1itt.le diEerence to int,roduce port.folio deckions for f i r m as well) and a recognit.ion that the saving decision of households may det,ermine the currently accept.able yield ro(t). As before, if this saving decision is considered as subject to influence, then the control variable may be viened as determining the yield r0(t). But it should be noticed tmhat t.hen t.he planner must take the price equations as given; control would be limited to choosing a value for ro at each instant and initial condit.iom p,*(O) to begin.
In Fig. 2 , as before, the decision of the firm is represented by the block labeled production block. Information inputs into t.his block are the prices W o , W,, W 2 , established for services of productive fact,ors, and the prices PO (by convent.ion set at. unity), PI, P?, established for the goods produced. The firm then determines bhe act,ual inputs of productive fact.ow and t,he actual output of goods, so as to make expected profits a maximum. The prices W O , W1, W z are themselves established, as before, on a market (enclosed in dashed lines in Fig. 2 ) to which households offer fact,or services according to the household ex-enditure decision and from which firms demand these services. The prices PI and P,, on t.he other hand, are established on capital markets by the condition that prices must be such t.hat all asset stocks must. be willingly held. For this condition to hold, t,he prices PI and P2 must coincide with the perfect asset prices PI* and Pz* computed according to the differential equations at. the top of Fig. 2 . When this coincidence is attained, the household port.folio decision has established the prices P I , P2, taken as data by the 6rm. The household saving decision may then be thought. of as det,ermining the inst,antaneous yield or return on s e t s PO ( t ) , which is necessary in t,he differential equations for PI and Pz. Given this yield To, the 1' Again note the implicit assumption that time can be stopped while these capital market* adjust fully to the ideal values defined at each time 1. There is room for research int.0 properties of grorth models where complete adjustment is not achieved before the system moves on. The differential equations are thus derived aa a description of a market process, not as a condition that any sinele crit.erion he optimized (although, of course, the market process itself reflects individual opt.imizing beharior in portfolio management rentals (prices of factor services) W 1 and W2, and the existing prices PI and P2, the differential equations a t the top of Fig. 2 are complete. Given the output flom Y1 and Yn established by the firm, the remaining differential equations governing the growth of asset stocks are also complete, and t,he long-run evolution (governed by the equations displayed above the dashed line in Fig. 2 ) of the syst,em is fully determined. The upshot of the preceding discussion is that one can often view optimal control problems in economics in the following summary way. Production theory, entailing at each moment efficient static allocation of exist.ing resources, determines a set of feasible or attainable output vect,ors. Demand conditions, which -will generally involve a number of control variable or instruments, serve to pick out a unique point from the att.ainable set. These demand condit,ions may be derived from some optimizing criterion, that is, the cont,rol variables may be selected in the light of some criterion purporting to represent individual or social welfare. Obvious questions arise: Is there a unique positive equilibrium so determined? What kind of price mechanism or decentralized procedure could sustain the equilibrium? These questions, which have been studied a t length in economic theory, properly belong to what might be called static economics. Growth theory in economics now builds on this material to investigate what kind of growth in stocks comes about as a result of the instantaneous equilibrium est,ablished. Until quite recently, growth theory was relatively simple because it suppressed almost all the structure connected with the determination of instantaneous equilibrium. But. it is clear that as growth theory mat.wes, all this hidden structure has to come back into view.
Thus, to summarize: I) The static allocation problem enables all relevant variables to be mitten as functions of relatively few underlying "endowment" levels or levels of factor stocks. If, in an optimizing problem, the control variables were taken to include allocations of available resources to possible uses, then the maximization of the usual Hamiltonian expression would ent.ail solution of this static allocation problem and might, therefore, involve solution of a large-scale nonlinear programming problem at each moment..
2)
If a decentralized system is assumed, then the static allocation problem might be left to a market mechanism, with control being exercised only over saving rates or similar variables. I n this case it. must be recognized that the sbssumption that the static equilibrium configuration is achieved instantaneously a t each moment is a crucial idealization.
3) If the decentralized system involves several distinct durable asets, then capital market trading d, in principle, bring about satisfaction of differential equat,ions for asset prices which prove t.0 be of the same form as the Euler-Lagrange equations for the state variables in t.he system. In this case control need not be exercised direct.ly over rates of accumulation of each asset separately, but. may be left to a market mechanism wipith profibmaximizing producers, provided only that a value TO is opt.imally selected a t each instant and prices pr*(O) are selected appropriately at the initial time. Again, the idealization that perfect asset prices are alwap maintained should be noted.
These observ&ions may be illustrated with a few examples, to which the next section is devoted. .) The problem of optimal economic growth in this context, is to determine a saving policy which maximizes some performance index. The criterion function suggested in Section I1 is where T might, be infinite and p might be positive, zero, or negat.ive depending on the decision as to whether "time preference" or population weighted utility is appropriate. One must, therefore, write C in terms of the state variables by observing that if the only use of output is for consumption or for saving-, and s is the fraction of output saved, t.hen
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
follows immediately. Thm one obtains the system
where P, 6, and n me constants with 6 and n definitely positive. Transforming to per capita terms by introducing k = K / L and
For fixed s and p , t.he integrand function and the Hamiltonian H = U[(1 -~) J ( k ) ] e -~~ + p [ s f ( k )
-(n + 6)h-] are concave in k. This is a st.raightforward problem, solved by straightforward met,hods. There is no point, here in going into the details, which can be found in C a s
[ll], [ l a ] ilnalyt,ical solut.ion is generally not feasible, but complete information can be obtained from a phase diagram, which need not be drawn here. Int,roducing q = pept, one may then m i t e the two equation q stem
which has an equilibrium point (k*, l), where k* is d e h e d byf'(k*) = p + n -I-6. When the utility function is linear, the point (k*, 1) represents a singular arc along which the optimal control s is not immediately determined by maximization of the Hamiltonian, but is determined by a condition that the system remain a t the equilibrium point. It may be easily shorn that the point, (k*, 1) has saddle-point properties, and thus that, for any initial value ko, there is a unique initial price q(0) such that t.he system point satisfying the preceding equations converges to (kr, 1) . Details of the analysis may be found elsewhere. What are t,he interesting t h i n e about this problem? First, consider t,he time horizon and t,he question of transversality condit.ion. When 6he horizon is idnite, but p is positive and C(c) is bounded above 0x1 any feasible path, then t,he integral converges and it. is obsenred that the price variable tends t.o zero in the limit (as one might. expect by a n d o 0 with t.ransversality condit,ions for t,he finite horizon case).
When Tis infinite and p is zero, the integral diverges, but it. is possible to show t.hat
has a finite upper bound and that, therefore, a ranking may be based on the measure of divergence from bliss (the maximum sustainable utility level 72*). One observes in this c a e t.hat prices do not. tend to zero. (See Koopmans [48] .) When Tis infinite and p is negative, the integral diverges and the criterion J yiel& no sat.isfactory ordering. For cases in which the horizon is infinite, then, t,he quest.ion as to appropriate terminal condit.ions seems open in general, although in part.icular problems it, is possible to show that vanishing of the value of the terminal capital stock is a necessary condition for optimality.
For finite horizon problems, the difficulty is simply that there is no natural st,opping time and no nat.ural set of terminal conditions to impose. (See the discussion by Chahavarty [16] and ManEchi [57] .)
The second interestring feature illustrated by this first example is t.he characteristic form of the solutions which emerge. Because of the saddle-point equilibrium, the opt,imal paths display a catenary or "turnpike" property which has greatly fascinated economists. One version of this cat,enary property is worked out in t,he author's dissertation [21a] and t.he ent.ire problem is worked out in detail in Samuelson [78], [80] and Cass [ l l ] , [12] . The original turnpike conjecture is due to Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow [26] ; its mathema,-tical significance is discussed in Inada [42] , Finally, an interpretat,ion of t.he auxiliary variable is interesOing to the economkt. On economic grounds one can argue that, the current earnings of a capital good must settle at. the net, value of an extra unit of machine service, so that. earnings of bhe capital good in this example can be mitten as
where a ( t ) is the value of a unit, increase in the flow of out,put,. If one were to t.ake t.he consumption good a the standard of value, measuring all prices in units of the consumption good, and to assign to the capital good an imputed price q(t), measured also relative to t.he consumpt,ion good as st.andard, then it could be argued that the value of an increase in the flow of out.put (which is split in the proportions 8, 1 -s between capital goods and consumption goods) ought to be simply t.he weighted average
n5t.h this interpretation, it can be seen that the differential equation satisfied by t.he auxiliary variable q(t) is identical t.o the capital market trading condition sahfied by the perfect asset. price p * ( t ) described in Section III.16
Example 2: Two-Sector Model Example 1 focused on t.he question of how much the community should save; t,he production specification was artificially simplified by direct since it makes sense t o measure all variable3 including auxiliary variable, 16 In the case of the linear ut.ility function, the interpretation can be fairly in physical units. When the utility function is nod linear. the auxiliary variable takes'on units of m a r~n a l uti1it.y (that is, of the derivative of the utility function) xhich is not ccnstant. Nevertheless, the interpretation is helpful in suggestihg the nature of optimal trajectories and permits one to think of,the rnaximum principle BS a technique for det.ermining the appropriate a s e t p n c ? which transform the entire int.ertempora1 maximisatlon problem Into a statlc rnaxlmization problem which might be solved by compet.itit-e marketa, once suitable terminal conditions have been est,ablished. the asumption that one could in the model simply divide the output flow between investment and consumpt.ion, as if output were a single homogeneous commodity. More realistically, the division is accomplished by diverting resources from one sector to the ot.her, and some resources might. be well adapted t.o only one use. Recognition of this fact ent.ails considering an economy with two distinct, sectow and imperfect transferability from output of one to output of the other. I n this case there is still a single state variable k , but there are several addit.iona1 variables associated with the determination of instant.aneous equilibrium. Leaving all details of the derivation to Uzawa [lo41 and Shell [87] , we may write t,he system equation in per capita form as
where now kl and w are components of t.he solution vector z t.o a set of equilibrium condit,ions
to be satisfied at all t.imes and sy, sW are cont.roLs. Written errplicit,ly, the sysbem is where 0 5 u = LJL 51 is the fraction of the labor force assigned to the first sector, which produces investment. goody. Constraints 3) and 4) represent market clearing conditions, while 1) and 2) represent necessary conditions for the maximization of the appropriate Hamiltonian H when kl, 122, and u are considered control variables chosen subject, t,o 3) and 4), and to non-negativity c0nst.raint-s on all variables.
The criterion to be maximized is J = C (1 -u ) y p e --U .
The point of this example is only to illustrate that, m was remarked in Section 111, t.he complex character of the moment.ary equilibrium will generally mean that the maximizat.ion of the Hamilt.onian a t each moment is a nontrivial problem in concave programming.
Example 3: TEO Capital Goods Model Exampla 1 and 2 both illust.rate models which cont,ain only one durable good and which, t,herefore, involve no capital market trading. The present example deals with t.wo distinct capital goods, labeled (in per capita form) kl and k2, and, therefore, must, deal somehow with capital market equilibrium conditions (auxiliary equations) as a part of bhe complete descriptive system to be optimized.
Letting subscripts on f now denote partial differentiation, define (which already incorporates some nonopt.imizing caving behavior) and let the syst.em equations be Determine the control u so as to maxinlize c(t)e-ptdt.
This problem, which is drawn from Shell and Stiglitz [88] , is 5truc-turally litt,le different from Example 5. The feature which is of interest at the moment is only that the opt,imal cont.ro1 in this ca+e must, involve auxiliary variables pl and p z such that if with the usual equations governing the auxiliary variables, the system becomes unstable in the sense that asbitrary init,ial prices will lead ultimately to the worst rather than the best of all possible ~0 r l d s . I~ Only a transversality condition related to some distant terminal date can rule out assignment of the arbit,rary initial prices leading away from equilibrium; Shell and Stiglitz [S8] attempt to determine whether a competitive system has any natural nay to guarantee satisfaction of such transversality condit.ions. The matter is further discwsed by Kurz [50] and Hahn [log] .
Example 4: Renewal Model
The preceding examples largely ignore the question of timing of returns from investment. Nore detailed analysis of investment projects, however, emphasize this issue, in part because reinvestment of intermediate cash throw-off is an important source of financing in itself. To illust,rate this kind of question, draxn more from microeconomia than growth theory itself, consider a possible extension of a renewal model st.udied by Chipman [ 181. The system may be illustrated as follons. (See Fig. 3.) From gross output .r is deducted a depreciation charge u. From t,he remainder y is deducted a saving sy. The remainder (1 -s)y = c is available for consumption. The t,wo deductions are pooled tu obtain a sum v = sy + u available for reinvestment. Gross output 1: and the depreciation charge I( depend on all past investments as shown.
Problem: Let a(t) be a given function such that 0 < s," j~( l !Idt < a.
Let
Nhere c is defined as before. Then determine the functions s(t), 6 ( t ) , so as to yield a maximum for J . As subsidiary problems, if either s ( t ) or s i t ) be arbit.rarily given, determine the optimal form for the other.
The point of this example is that renewal or vintage models may require the economist to go to met.hods which do not depend on the possibility of a finite-st.ate representation. See also Levhari and Sheshinski [X] . market prices, then the system in general diverges from its saddlepoint equilib.
An obvious esteusion is to admit the finite time lag in training as well as the resource cost of training. This, of course, entails solution of systems of differential difference equations, but such extension may be helpful in dealing satisfactorily with some of the fascinating questions involved in optimal allocation of resources for investment in education or research, where gestation l a 5 may be crucial.
Exumple 6
Consider as a final example a case in which there is a delay, but of a smoother type. Such a problem, which might be referred to as a problem of indirect control, is illustrated by the following:
where u is a given smooth function; f(k) is the usual well-behaved per capita production function; y, n, and ~.r are positive constants; and u is a control variable. The problem here, of course, is that the control u is "far away" from the important state variable I;. In a preliminary paper [23] on this problem, Dobell and Ho suggest that the optimal trajectory may require sn-itching infinitely fast. I n some computed examples with a smoothed version employing a penalty function on u. rather than inequality constraints, an oscillatory solut.ion is demonstrat.ed. Interesting extensions to cases where t,here may be error in implementing control or imperfect. observation of present state are obvious.
V. CONCLTJD~XG ~O M M E S T S
It is silly to spend much time speculating about future applications of control theory in economics; unexpected new directions d undoubtedly emerge. But t.his quick survey might. suggest a few of the issues likely to be of interest.
1) The technical quest.ion of the t.ransversa1it.y conditiom necessary in a free endpoint problem with infinite horizon seems yet to be fully resolved.
2 ) Selection of an appropriate intertemporal welfare function will continue to be a challenge.
3) Renewal or vintage models in econonlics lead to a class of problems different from t.he usual problems with finite state space discwsed previously. Perhaps recent m-ork on programming in linear spaces will prove relevant here, but the apparent restriction t,hus far to linear systems is stringent-probably fatal-in most economic applications.
4j The introduction of lags, through "double integrzat.ors" or related higher order systems, d lead to problems in which the optimal control is oscillatory, and t.his result should lead to furt.her elaboration of political and economic costs involved in frequent changes in control variables themselves. Problems where t,ime delays depend on control variables or on paramet.ers to be optimally selected also arise naturally in the study of public invest,ment. decisions. 5) Turning from the so-called one-sector model to a two-: -ector one capital good model, one finds nothing particularly new in the character of the optimal paths, but already sees a hint. of computational difficulties n-hich may be crucial as numerical aork proceeds. These difficulties arise because the static equilibrium codguration, for given values of state and auxiliary variables, is obtained by solution of a system of nonlineax simultaneous equations. Equivalently, maximizing the Hamilt,onian involvfs the solution of a nonlinear programming problem a t each moment. Perhaps, because of continuity considerations, the solution from one instant, stored, will prove a good starting point for an iterative computation at the nest inst.ant. But, in any case, it seems that numerical solution must involve step-by-step integration with solution of a (possibly large) constrained masimization problem a t each step, the step size itself being taken small near points of discontinuity in the cont.rols. Kendrick and Taylor [45] are tackling some of these problem-in work on numerical methods for economic models. 6 ) 1\Ioving from the two-sector to t,he two capital good model, one encountera fascinating questions about the signzcance of price behavior. In contrast. to the usual control problem, the economist thinks naturally in terms of realizing control through the auxiliary variables or prices. X true feedback control implies centralized direct.ion of the system; almost any scheme for decentralization depends precizely on computing values for the auxiliary variables and requiring the sJ-stem to respond to these. For the economist, indeed, this is preci5elJ-the decent,ralization which can, in some case5 a t least., be achieved through competitive markets. Bnt t.hen, without perpetual recomputation of prices in the face of shocks, the decentralized system will show unstable development.. Since the whole q u etion of the effectiveness of, and means t,o realize, decentralized cont.rol in large system is very topical just. now, this issue may have significance outside economics.
bIoreover, these considerations emphasize that t,he "plant,'! n-hich the economist studies may include the usual auxiliary equations as a part of the syhtem. That is, optimizing behavior by individuals with respect to portfolio decisions may force asset prices t.0 satisfy the auxiliary (Euler-Lagrange) equations, bringing yields on all assets into equality. Once the common yield is itself det.ermined (perhaps by the condition that. total resources offered for investment by households match total resources demanded for capital formation by firm), then t,he determination of asset prices is complete (given init.ia1 conditionsj. Profit-maximizing decisions by producers realize the optimum composition of output and thus sat.isfy the requirement that, the Hamiltonian be maximized at each instant.
Under t h e e circumstances, control by an economic planner is limited to influencing the common yield on assets (by offering some other security as an alternative st,ore of value, bringing saving or investment into line through tax policies, or by operating directly on saving or investment desires), and perhaps to establishing initial asset prices conAtent rvith t.he appropriate transvenality conditions. A t any rate, the point. is that the economic planner may have t.o take as given both the usual system equations and the usual EulerLagrange auxiliary equat,iom, and initial condit.ions for each, as well as a side condition which already maximizes H with respect to production deckions. Only relat.ively few Indirem control variabics, and pcrhnp some paramerer optimization, remaill 13 provide a channel for it fluencing the economy. (Perhaps in t.he United States this will be thought to be juat as well.) 7) Without elaborat,ion, w e can observe that the preceding consideration. give a prominent role to decisions of portfolio theory. But portfolio problems make lit.tle sense except in an explicitly stochastic contest; hence, even abstracting from problems of errors in observations of state or in implementation of control (w-hich one probably should not. do anyway), problems of stochast.ic control will be central in economic applications to come.
8)
Finally, this discussion displays one common theme in looking at various consequences of t.he fact t.hat. economic sytem-involve extensive comcious decision making. In part, this fact simplifies the realization of optimal control because, by Adam Smith's principle of the invisible hand, individual deckions made in t,he light of selfinterest, also help to maximize H at each instant, and trading of assets on capital markets helps to bring about. satkfaction of Samuelson's dynamic efficiency conditions, which are also the auxiliary equations of Pontq-agin. But letting the system t.ake mat,ters into its own hands has its dangers: if init.ia1 price quotations are arong, it is unclear when the market has to face up to that fact, and divergence toward a st,able minimum rather t.han a saddlepoint, maximum may result. Moreover, conscious decision making by compouents of the system d l result in responses to cont,rol which act to cushion t.he effect,, to insulate each component as much as possible from the control.
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The effect,iveness of control may be reduced, therefore, and the cont.rollabilit.y of the system may itself come into question.
These considerations, particularly of t.he dual-st.ability feature inherent. in t.he decentralized system, give impetus to t.he search for control rules which may depart a little from optimality, but which are robust and stable in the face of minor shocks or errors and which may relieve Congress of the need to implement new tax policies infinit.ely quickly or infinitely often.
There are many other ext.ensions currently under study: introduction of the notion t.hat. technical improvement is generated within the system in various ways (see Uzawa [lo31 for one example); introduction of a labor force structure and a finite t,raining time for labor, leading to formulation of cont.ro1 problem with time delays; st.ndy of syst.ems in which control is incomplete or very indirect; introduction of uncertainty eit.her in observat.ion of the state or implementation of control; and so 011. Applications in microeconomics t.o saving and portfolio decisions of the individual consumer or to investment and other operating decisions of individual firms, or applications of the theory of differential games to problems of bargaining and economic rivalry have not. been emphasized, but certainly should not be overlooked. The list is long, but perhaps t.his discussion illust.rates the kinds of intriguing control problems economists may be talking about when the presidential campaign of 1972 rolls around.
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